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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

WEST UNION CANAL COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

CASE

vs.

NO. 7190
PROVO BENCH CANAL AND
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a
corporation; et al,
Defendant and Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
(Numbers in parentheses preceded by "JR", refer to
pages in Judgment Roll file; plain numbers in parentheses
refer to pages in Transcript).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Sometime between about 6 o'clock p. m. of May 27th,
and 5 o'clock a. m. of May 28th, 1946, during heavy rain-
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fall, the pipe line of the West Union Canal Company at
"Skinner's Hollow" in Orem, Utah County, Utah, was
washed out. The West Union Canal Company, plaintiff
and respondent herein, brought action against the Provo
Bench Canal and Irrigation Company, and numerous individual defendants, claiming that they negligently caused
or permitted excess water to flow into the West Union Canal, thereby causing damages in the sum of $2,500.00.
All defendants except Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company, appellant herein, were eliminated from the
cause by non-suit granted in their favor at the close of
plaintiff's evidence (JR 65; 235), From a judgment for
damages in the sum of $699.25 entered against Provo Bench
Canal and Irrigation Company, it takes this appeal (JR 69).
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED
So that the statement of facts can be reviewed conveniently in the light of the legal questions presented for
determination herein, such questions will be first set out.
In passing, it may be noted that various errors were
committed by the trial court in respect of the reception of
evidence. Some relate to the general rules of evidence
(399, 400). Others are predicated upon the view of the
learned trial judge that the damages sought to be established were legally attributable to the appellant (41-43, 65,
155) . The former are overshadowed by basic legal questions
of far-reaching importance. A decision as to the latter is dependent upon the law governing the responsibility of irrigation companies, and the elements of proof essential to
show actionable negligence and proximate cause, all more
directly raised by other assignments. None of the evidentiary questions in and of themselves appears determina-
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tive. In order that the fundamental issues may not be obscured, \Ve are limiting our presentation to them, viz:
I. Must an irrigation company, distributing water to
laterals maintained and controlled by stockholders of such
company, and others, under a spstem of turns arranged
by such stockholders, assure, at its peril that all such laterals and branches thereof to, and beyond, the lowest user,
shall have means for the disposal of excess water in the
event that any user fails to take his turn, or water beyond
the control of the company otherwise gets into, or flows
through the laterals and their branches; or, in other words,
does there exist such a legal duty of construction as concluded by the trial court?
IT. Is water allocated to certain stockholders and diverted from the canal of an irrigation company with other
water into laterals under the control of such stockholders
the wat-er of such irrigation company not only up to the
time it is diverted into such laterals, but also while it flows
through the same and until it is turned upon the land of
each individual user, so that the irrigation company has
the responsibility to supervise and control the diversion of
such water as between all stockholders do\Vll to the lowest
user, to preclude the possibility of damage from unused water assigned among themselves to particular stockholders,
or from rain or waste water, or a combination of all; or,
in other words, does there exist such a legal duty of management and control as concluded by the trial court?
ill. Was there any violation of duty or negligence
as pleaded, or at all, on the part of the Provo Bench Canal
and Irrigation Company; or, in other words, was there any
delict as found by the trial court?
IV. If negligence were assumed for the sake of ar-
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gument, is there any competent evidence to establish that
this caused or contributed to the damages claimed and
awarded in view of the speculation and conjecture involved
in plaintiff's theory, the absence of evidence as to the failure .of any stockholder to use his water, the heavy rain at
the time, the uncertainty as to when the damage occurred,
and the uncontradicted affirmative evidence that the respondent company itself on the night of the break was
flowing more water in its canal than the pipe-line would
carry; or, in other words, did proximate cause or connection exist?
In the argument to follow, these issues will be discussed
in the order stated, under corresponding propositions which
are believed to be borne out by the facts and the law.
THE FACTS

Both appellant and respondent are irrigation companies of Orem, ,Utah, organized to sell and distribute water
to stockholders (JR 28; 40) . The individual defendants
were stockholders of Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation
Company (JR 28, 43).
Plaintiff in its amended complaint alleged that between the afternoon of May 28th and the morning of May
29th, 1946 (plaintiff's evidence is conflicting, but it developed in the latter part of its evidence that the occasion referred to was May 27-28), the irrigation water of Provo
Bench Canal Irrigation Company was negligently, wilfully
and. unlawfully permitted, allowed and caused to flow from
its ditch onto a public street where it picked up stones,
earth and rubbish, and from which the water, with the debris, flowed into plaintiff's canal; that by reason of the
stones, earth and rubbish gathered with said water, the
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plaintiff's ditch \vas filled with rubbish, earth and stones;
the flow of plaintiff's canal was blocked, causing the water
to overflow and breaking plaintiff's canal (JR_ 29).
It was further alleged by plaintiff that the individual
defendants were negligent in failing to use their water turns
during the period in which the damage occurred ( JR 30) .
It \vas further alleged that Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company neglected to notify the individual stockholders of the time the water would be put into the ditch for
the use of the individual defendants and that it neglected
and refused to provide for the care of excess and unused
water in the ditch; knowing that the water placed therein
was not cared -for, and used by, such stockholders and was
a menace and potential danger to plaintiff's ditch, and after
plaintiff notified said Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation
Company of such failure to take care of said water and of
the potential damage to plaintiff's ditch (JR 30).
Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company denied
any negligence on its part, and affirmatively alleged that
plaintiff's damage was proximately caused and contribu..
ted to by the carelessness of plaintiff in failing to keep the
pipe lines and flume in good state of repair and design free
from rubbish and in failing to strengthen portions of its
ditch to withstand conditions reasonably to have been anticipated and in failing to divert water from said ditch
which substantially contributed to said breaking; and negligently turned water into the canal so as to contribute to
said damage and negligently failed to take reasonable precaution in view of heavy rainfall (JR 43, 44).
The record discloses that the West Union Canal Company is a corporation having the control of a portion of the
waters of Provo River, and acting through a president, a
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water master and other officers, directors and agents (JR
28, 36.. 37). The West Union Canal, owned and operated by
that company, diverts water from said Provo River in the
vicinity of the U~ah Power & Light Company Steam Plant
below the mouth of Provo Canyon, running thence for
about two miles along the west edge of the river bottom,
approaching the east slope of Provo Bench under which it
runs southeasterly for about three additional miles to the
so-called Davis Corner (68) , past which is flows northwesterly for about a half mile to Skinner's Hollow (75) , thence
continuing to the property of the Geneva Steel Company
through w~ich excess water is conveyed to Utah Lake
(143).

The West Union Canal is about two feet deep and eight
feet wide, holds a maximum of 70 second feet of water at
its head, about 75 second feet just below the diversion point
of its lateral No. 2 (about a half mile above the Davis Corner) (72.). At the Davis Corner its capacity is 50 second
feet before it spills from the Canal over the headgate (77).
It will carry through the pipeline at Skinner's Hollow a
maximum of only 35 second feet (75), there being no spillway at that point to provide for any excess water. The
canal ordinarily carries about 30 second feet of water at
its head, except in the high water season, a portion of which
water is diverted into various laterals. This was the amount
of flow at the head the morning before the washout (P. Ex.
1). There is no testimony, however, as to how much water
was in the West ·Ufllion Canal the night of the washout (252253), except that it was running full and to overflowing at
the Davis Corner before any water entered from the road
(287, 289). The company had no record of the amount of
water in its lateral No. 2 on the night in question (91) and
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it \vas reported the water was turned from lateral No. 2
back into the canal (241, 259, 261).
In its course the canal traverses farm land, waste land,
\Veeds and underbrush (68). A waste ditch to drain excess
water from the new State Road empties into it (70, 78, 256)
and other drainage (275) . It also flows past or through
nwnerous corrals and other places where livestock is fed
(264).
The Davis Corner is located at 20th South and Main
Street in Orem, Utah, which is some one-half mile west of
the State Highway and approximately that distance below
the diversion point of the so-called West Union Lateral No.
2. Davis has his home on the northwest corner at that intersection. ·The West Union Canal crosses Main Street in
a westerly direction just north of the Davis home, at which
point there is a bridge over the canal. Immediately to the
west of the bridge there is a headgate leading south from
the canal through which water is diverted across the Davis
property next to the house for lower users (77, Def's Ex.
4). The carrying capacity of the canal at this point is
about 50 second feet (77). The canal then proceeds in a
northwesterly direction to Skinner's Hollow and to the Geneva Steel Company property beyond, as aforesaid.
Formerly, a concrete pipe carried the water from the
top of Skinner's Hollow to the bottom; in 1945, however,
this was replaced by corrugated pipe supported by trestle
work with earth fill and with abutments of concrete at its
ends. About sixty days before the occurrence in question,
a 24-inch concrete pipe was laid within the corrugated
metal pipe (97-98) and the water had been running in this
for a period of only about 45 days prior to the washout
(98). The work at Skinner's Hollow was done by an offi-
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cer of the West Union Canal without the benefit of design, assistance or advice from an engineer except for a
statement as to what to use for joints (1621"'165). The soil
in the vicinity of the pipe was very loose and unstab~e
(173).
About 75 feet above the intake in the unimproved portion of the canal was a screen consisting of boards set on
edge with openings between for the purpose of screening
out debris which might otherwise pass into the intake of
the pipe (86). It was not unusual to find debris not only
on this screen, but on the splitter board at lateral No. 2
above (82). The capacity of the pipe itself was substantial but the flow of water which could pass through the intake did not exceed 35 second feet (214-215), there being
no place for any excess to go but over the side of the intake into the loose sand and gravel forming its base.
It was at this point that the principal damage complained of occurred. Apparently as a result either of an
excess flow in the canal or some obstruction in the intake,
the water had flowed over the sides of the intake, washing
the foundation of the concrete away and causing the pipe
to fall, due to the lack of support from sand and gravel underneath (242). There was no sign of washing in the vicinity c.l the screen (267-268), but it had caved in the immediate vicinity of the intake and aparently washed back
south a few feet (89-90).
The Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company is a
corporation, with usual officers and directors. The Provo
Bench Canal diverts water from Provo River at the mouth
of Provo Canyon, from which it traverses the side and
onto the Bench, where it furnishes water to various laterals in the Orem area.
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The stock of the company is divided into 1954 shares
(326), entitling the holders to their proportionate part of
the waters of the canal. The company adds the shares together and gives each lateral its proportion of the measurement in the weir according to the shares on that lateral
(330). Six hundred ninety-one shares are owned by the
North Union Irrigation Company, a separate corporation
(327). The water is diverted into the head of the North
Union Canal, which has three branches, the Loveridge Lateral, The Stratton Lateral and the Knight Lateral (327328). Below the North Union diversion on the Provo Bench
Canal is the Nickle Ditch, dividing into the Davis Lateral,
the North Spencer Lateral, the South Spencer Lateral and
the Curtis Lateral (329); at about the same point the southeast Ditch diverts from the Canal (330).
These laterals serve the stockholders of the Provo
Bench Canal and Irrigation Company and the stockholders
of certain other canal companies flowing water through the
Provo Bench Canal.
The secretary of the canal company receives orders
from the stockholders for change from one lateral to another, if desired, and distributes water into the new laterals
for them (330-331); but the canal company has nothing to
do with administration of laterals or in designating their
officers (333-334) .
There is no such thing as the Southeast Ditch Company, except as that refers to a group of farmers using waters from the so-called Southeast Ditch (104). They simply get together for the ticketing of their water and sometimes for mutual ditch cleaning (118). The Southeast
Ditch is a lateral leading off from the Provo Bench Canal
at the Ford Cprner (104) and proceeding southwesterly to
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the Kartchner Corner on the state road, where it divides
into two principal branches, one leading northwesterly to
the Roy Davis farm With 48 users on it (365-366); the other
branch from the Kartchner Corner leads in a general westerly direction for the service of 50 users, including Christenson, who is the lowest user on this branch (124; 365).
A continuation of the ditch across the Christenson land is
used as a head ditch by him to water on either side (193).
This is his own ditch (124) and it terminates at his fence
line on the east side of Main Street about 500 feet north of
the West Union Canal bridge across Main Street heretofore
referred to, near the so-called Davis Comer, at which point
it is very small (123). The Southeast Ditch, however, does
not run to the road, but ends at the Christenson farm,
which is the last place served by that particular branch of
the ditch (112). He is the lowest user, and one branch of
the ditch simply runs to his premises (124). The ditch is
about 2~ miles from its head to the end of the north
branch (372) .
Besides the two main branches mentioned, various
other laterals take off on either side of the Southeast Ditch
to serve water users in the general vicinity; some ditches
serve only one water user, and others a large number.
There are a total of about 70 individual water users on the'
Southeast Ditch (117) . This ditch has been substantially
in the same position and has been operated in substantially
the same way for at least 40 years (124; 121).
An arrangement has been made by stockholders to
care for any unused or surplus water in the ditch. A steel
gate has been placed near the head, so that people who do
not want to use their turns can notify Roy Olsen, who shuts
the water off. All stockholders know this (112-113, 368,
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374). The canal company has no control over this gate
(368). Surplus water also can be turned down the North

branch of the ditch, from which it is impossible for water
to get into the West Qnion Canal (375).
Stockholders on each of the main laterals leading from
the Provo Bench Canal. for the purpose of cleaning the canal and providing for the distribution of water between
them, appoint a ditch secretary, and some have a board or
committee for the purpose of determining the period of
water turn per share which is to be allowed in the ditch
(109).
The Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company has
nothing to do with this (110). The secretary of the ditch
is notified by the secretary of the Provo Bench Canal and
Irrigation Compeny each year how many share of water
are being distributed to the ditch in accordance with the
request of the stockholders (119, 342). The ditch then allocates the turns among the stockholders on the ditch in
accordance with their stock holdings (110). Except for
certifying the number of shares on the ditch, including the
number of shares of Provo Reservoir Corporation stock
and Tanner stock flowed through the canal in an arrangement with the Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company (126-127), the canal company never has assumed anything to do with the distribution of the water of the respective laterals or ditches (110, 128; 352-353), simply diverting into the head of the respective laterals the amount
of water called for by the total number of shares represented on the lateral (123). The individual stockholders have
the right to use the flow of water through the ditch (120).
The canal company delivers water at the head of the Southeast Ditch to the 70 users on the ditch entitled thereto
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(123). The Provo Reservoir Company rents water to various people using such water through the Southeast Ditch
also. They have both Provo Bench and Provo Reservoir
water in the ditch (126), and also Tanner water (128).
At some recent, but undisclosed, time, the Provo Bench
Canal and Irrigation Company arranged with the government for cementing on some of the laterals, and amended its articles to provide for the levying of assessments
for this purpose (336-338) ; but there is no other evidence
that the corporation has assumed any control of the distribution of water, except to divert such water into the
heads of the laterals in accordance With the amount of water represented by owners on the laterals desiring to take
their water through such laterals (352-353, 379). There is
no evidence that any cementing was done on any lateral
other than at its head, and the evidence does not disclose
that any cementing at all was done on any part of the
Southeast Ditch.
The evidence further discloses that all of the water
turned into each lateral, during every period of the irrigation season, has been allocated by the stockholders on the
lateral into turns, there being no period when someone has
not been assigned the use of the water (369) .
About 30 days prior to the damage, at a meeting between officers of the West Union Canal and Provo Bench
Canal, the danger of excess water entering the West Union
Canal was discussed, and the Provo Bench officers indicated they would call the attention of its stockholders to
the matter (56, 59, 60, 61). Shortly thereafter, the Provo
Bench Canal notified all of the representatives of the various laterals that the company could assume no responsibility, but that the individual stockholders and laterals
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'vould have to so manage their water as to prevent damage (Pl. Ex. H) .
Taking in sequence a composite of the events as disclosed by the evidence, on the morning of May 27th, 1946,
presumably early in the morning, as was his custom (252253), Frank Wentz, river commissioner of Provo River,
measured the water entering the Provo Bench Canal and
found it to be 139 second feet. He also measured the water
entering the West Union Canal and found it to be 30 second
feet (Pl. Ex. I; 130, 131).
At about eight o'clock of that morning, Mr. Anderson,
water master for Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company, and lVlr. Keech, its president, being concerned about
the heavy rainfall, went to the mouth of Provo Canyon,
turned out of the Provo Bench Canal approximately twothirds of its flow, so that the next measurement of the canal was 64 second feet (359-360; 382-383) .
It continued raining most, if not all, of that day and
night and until the early morning of the 28th. During that
period, a total of .87 inch of rain fell, this being the heaviest rain_ of the year, except for the early Spring before
the waters were in the canals, and except for August, when
the water· was low. (Provo River Commissioner Report
1946, p. 37, Pl. Ex. I; 131; .97).
During the day of the 27th the water flowing in the
West Union Canal was observed to be more than the normal flow for that time of the year (343, 349).
At about 5:30 the evening of the 27th, the water master of the West Union Canal was in Skinner's Hollow and
observed some debris on the screen (243), but did not thinkit enough to justify removing. About that same time, one
of the officers of West Union Canal Company finished irri-
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gating in the vicinity of Skinner's Hollow and turned his
irrigation stream back into the canal (139).
At about 6 or 6:30 p. m. of May 27th, one Moroni Jensen saw a small stream coming into the road from the
Christenson ditch, but it had not reached the canal (179).
Although he was an officer of the West Qnion Canal, he
made no report and did nothing (191).
Sometime during the night of May 27-May 28th, it appears that stockholders of the West Union Canal Company,
not desiring the water assigned, turned the water flowing
in lateral No. 2 back into the canal (259-261), and that a
substantial amount of rain or waste water drained into that
canal from the side of the new state highway a half a mile
above the Davis Corner (322-325).
About 8 o'clock that night, Roy Davis left his home
to go to the picture show (286); no water was coming down
the road except a trickle of rain water, and none was entering the canal from the road (304-305) .
At about 11 o'clock that evening, a farmer, Ervil L.
Davis, was driving along Main Street in the vicinity of canal bridge and observed a small amount of water running
down the road. He did not know where it came from (6).
There was just a small stream and rut about 40 feet above
the West Union Canal (7-9). He didn't see where the water
was going (10). He could not remember whether it was
raining at the time (9-10) .
About midnight, Roy Davis returned from the picture
show and noted that the West Union c·anal was running
completely full and overflowing the weir through his place
(287-288; 295-296). He also noted that there was a small
stream of water running down the side of the road and
across the bridge, but that none was entering the canal
'

.
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{2S8). He \vent to bed and about 2 o'clock in the morning
he heard the sotmd of rocks rolling, and got up and observed that the water coming down the road, about sufficient to run through a 4-inch pipe, was running across the
bridge and washing below the bridge (289); none at that
time was entering the canal, but the canal was still running
full, with 3 inches of \Vater flowing out of the canal over
the six-inch board down the ditch through his place. The
capacity of the canal at this point was about 50 second feet
before it flowed over the headgate (77).
At aqout 5 o'clock in the morning of the 28th, the president of the West Union Canal was notified that the road
at the Davis Corner was washed (37). He called the
\Vater master, who sometime after went to Skinner's Hollow and fotmd the break there (243). The president spent
the hour followil1g the report of the road wash in turning
out the water from the West Union Canal (38), although
very little, if any, water was then entering from the road
(39). The headgate at lateral No. 2 was opened wide so as
to take the flow of water out of the canal, and other laterals were opened and the vvater turned out of the head
of the canal about 6:30 a. m. (51). Thereafter about 7
o'clock in the morning (39) the president of the company
found at Skinner's Hollow that the structure holding the
intake pipe had broken off, and the washing in the soft
sand and gravel underlying it had extended back about four
feet above the intake (242; 192; see also Pl. Ex. D). A large
amount of sand and gravel had been washed off the hillside into the canal in the bottom of Skinner's Hollow (3940). When the water master discovered the break, he estimated it was flowing about 16 or 17 second feet (245),
but he admitted that the flow was to the top of the cement
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structure (273). The record does not disclose whether the
water had been turned out of the canal by that time or not.
The road near the Davis Corner by 7 o'clock the morning of May 28th had been washed below the Christenson
ditch and above the canal, over a substantial distance (2912.92). The wash was variously estimated at 3 or 4 inches
wide and 6 inches deep (136); 6 or 7 inches deep (134); 8
inches wide and 4 inches deep (277-279) and 2 feet wide
(271).
From the sand and gravel washed from the road, the
bottom of the canal extending below the bridge for some
several hundred feet was covered with sand and gravel to
a depth near to the bridge of about one foot and petering
out below (21-24; 30; 34-35; 290-291; 180).
It further appeared that the sand and gravel so placed
would decrease the capacity of the canal (49) so that only
one-third as much water could pass the weir at Davis Corner and flow toward Skinner's Hollow as would otherwise
be the case (78).
The only evidence that water was running in the Southeast Ditch on the 27th or 28th was the testimony of Ludwig Christenson that on May 29th at about 7 o'clock in the
morning (after the washout had occurred) water was running down that ditch onto his land and a portion onto the
road. He turned all the water off his land and onto the
road (18-19). He had not observed water on the road at
any previous time that night and had not observed it in
the ditch above earlier (12-13). He did not know how
much water was in the ditch or on the road (13, 17), nor
how much was rain and how much was irrigation water
(14).
Because of the washout a completely new channel from

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

the intake to the bottom of Skinner's Hollow was constructed (67). The cost of removing the sand and gravel from
the canal immediately adjacent to the bridge amounted to
about $36.00 (182-183). It was "thought" that a bulldozer
at $6.00 per hour for 70 hours or a total of $420.00 was on
the full job at Skinner's Hollow (188). What part of this
was for removing the sand and gravel from the canal in
Skinner's Hollow and what part was for excavation for
ne\v construction to replace the old construction does not
appear (188), and no showing that this total amount paid
\vas reasonable appears (152-154). Another witness attempted to break the cost down between excavation and
other work, but still included in his balance the cost of excavating for the new and different construction (203-204).
The new construction in Skinner's Hollow was a much more
satisfactory, substantial and expensive structure in a different and better location (171-172; 198).
No attempt v1as made in the evidence to disclose what
part of the expenditure was for the improvement of the
existing structure and what part for repair of damage.
There was no evidence introduced to show that the water
users entitled to use water through the Southeast Ditch
did, or did not, use the water to which they were entitled
during the period involved.
The learned trial court took the view that the water
which caused the washout at Skinner's Hollow was the Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company's water, and that
notwithstanding the un-certainties of proof (415-416) and
law on which the conclusion rested, it would be the policy
of the court to hold the corporate defendant responsible.
Accordingly, the court found that the water in the
Southeast Ditch and its branches was the water of Provo
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Bench Canal and Irrigation Company (JR 54), that the
"Southeast Ditch Company" was an association of stockholders for the convenience of the appellant (JR 54), that
the company's water was negligently permitted to flow into the West Union Canal (JR 54), and that this particular
water and the debris which it carried caused the break at
Skinner's Hollow about a half mile below (JR 54-55). The
court assumed to determine what part of the damages
claimed was attributable to the Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company's water (JR 55).
ERRORS ASSIGNED
1. The court erred in overruling the general demurrer of Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company to plaintiff's amended complaint (JR 33, 37).
2. The court erred in denying the motion of appellant for a non-suit (JR 65; 238, 284).
The court erred in making and entering its finding of
fact No. 4, wherein it found that the Southeast Ditch Company is an association of stockholders of the Provo Bench
Canal and Irrigation Company for the convenience of said
company (JR 54).
4. The court erred in making and entering its finding
of fact No. 5 (JR 54).
5. The court erred in finding that the irrigation water
of the Provo Bench Canal flowing in the said ditch of said
company was negligently permitted and allowed to flow
from said ditch onto the public streets or highways along
the west line of said section 26 (JR 54) .
6. The court erred in finding that the irrigation water so flowing upon the street or highway flowed south
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along said street, picking up stones, earth and rubbish into
the ditch or canal of plaintiff (JR 54) .
7. The court erred in finding that by reason of the
stones, earth and rubbish so flowing on the ditch or canal,
together \Vith said \Vater, the ditch or canal of plaintiff
\Vas filled \Vith earth, stones and rubbish, the flow in said
ditch or canal was blocked, causing the water in said canal
to overflow the banks of the ditch or canal, washing away
an enclosed portion of plaintiff's canal, breaking said plaintiff's ditch or canal and depriving it of the use, profit and
benefit of the water flowing therein (JR 54-55).
8. The court erred in finding that by reason of the
filling of said ditch and the washing away of a portion of
plaintiff's canal, the plaintiff was damaged in the sum of
$699.25 (JR 55).
9. The court erred in making and entering its finding
of fact No. 7 (JR 54-55).
10. The court erred in finding that the Provo Bench
Canal and Irrigation Company failed and neglected to notify all of said individual stockholders at the time the water would be put in said ditch for said individual defendants
(JR 55).
11. The court erred in finding that Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company failed, neglected and refused
to provide for the care of excess and unused water from
said ditch, knowing that the water placed therein was not
cared for and used by said stockholders and was a menace
and potential danger to the ditch or canal of the plaintiff
and after plaintiff notified said Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company of such failure (JR 55).
12. The court erred in making and entering its finding No. 8 (JR 55).
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13. The court erred in making and entering its finding No. 9 (JR 55).
14. The court erred in making and entering its conclusion of law that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment
against the Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company
for damages in the sum of $699.25, and for costs (JR 56).
15. The court erred in making and entering its judgment whereby it granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company, for the sum of $699.25, and for costs
herein (JR 57).
16. The court erred in making and entering judgment in any sum against the defendant, Provo Bench Canal
and Irrigation Company.
17. The court erred in denying} defendant's motion
for new trial ( JR 68) .
ARGUMENT
It is the position of appellants that neither the duty of
design and construction, nor that of supervision and control rested upon it with respect to the branches of the socalled Southeast Ditch; that no actionable neglig~nce of
appellant was established, and that no damage suffered by
plaintiff was shown to have been proximately caused or
contributed to by appellant.
In brief, neither the law nor the facts established the
duties which the learned trial court assumed. There were
no negligent acts or omissions proved against the appellant, and it is questionable whether there are sufficient allegations of negligence in the amended complaint to vvithstand a general demurrer. Assuming negligence, there is
no competent proof that such negligence proximately
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caused, or contributed to, plaintiff's damages. On the contrary, the evid~nce affirmatively shows that the washout at
Skinner's Hollow \Vas the result of an excessive flow in the
West Union Canal-one beyond the capacity of the pipe
line intake-at a time when no water was entering the canal from the Southeast Ditch. There were numerous other
factors more likely to have caused the damage claimed than
any flow of water from the Southeast Ditch at any time,
and damages awarded, as well as the finding as to proximate cause, \vere based upon mere speculation and conjecture.
We further contend that the necessary effect and implications of the lower court's decision, if not reversed on
this appeal, will be to grieviously handicap and penalize irrigation companies, invite the shifting of legitimate ressponsibilities at the ultimate expense of company and stockholder alike, to promote judicial legislation making irrigation companies virtual insurors, and to circumvent well established principles with respect to burden of proof, proximate cause, and the sufficiency of evidence.
The general rules with respect to the liabilities and
responsibilities of canal and ditch owners and their responsibility for their own negligent acts or omissions are not
questioned. The application of these rules is the point in
the instant case, in view of the facts shown by the record.
Manifestly, the merit of our position depends a good deal
upon the facts established, or not established, as the case
may be. Hence in our Statement we have endeavored to
present a rather comprehensive summary of them, which,
as far as practical, will be supplemented, and not reiterated,
in the argument on our respective contentions as follows:
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L
THE APPELLANT WAS UNDER NO LEGAL DUTY TO
MAKE CHANGES IN THE DESIGN OR CONSTRUCTION OF BRANCHES OF THE SOUTHEAST DITCH,
OR SIMILAR LATERALS, OR TO CONSTRUCT ADDITIONAL DITCHES BELOW THE LOWEST USER.

Under this point we hope to be able to sustain assignments of error numbered 4, 5 and 11, particularly, and to
support our other assignments going to the question of
negligence.
In finding of fact No. 5 the trial court found, inferentially at least, that the Southeast Ditch was a ditch of the
Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company (Assignments
4 and 5). In finding No. 7 the court found that appellant
neglected to provide for the care of unused water in said
ditch (Assignment 11). In the court's oral opinion it is
clear that it assumed that the appellant was responsible
for the design and construction of the ditch down to and
beyond the lowest user, so as to insure against the possibility of damage to plaintiff (409-410).
This assumed duty of construction or design is in part,
at least, the foundation of the court's decision agaimt appellant. . Much emphasis was placed in the evidence upon
the fact that a branch of the Southeast Ditch ended at the
Christenson property, without any continuation thereof to
conduct unused water across the road, and to assure that
it would not enter the West Union Canal.
This duty of construction or design is not specifically
pleaded, and there is no suggestion in the evidence or pleading as to what could have been done by the appellant to construct a tail ditch from the end of this branch of the South-
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east Ditch for the purpose of avoiding the West Union Canal, assuming water \vere to flow beyond the lowest user.
As a matter of fact, because of the slope, and the dominating location of the West Union Canal, it would be impossible to build such a tail ditch without paralleling that
canal for more than a mile, extending past the Skinner Hollo\v, to the Geneva Steel Company, over which a further
right-of-way \vould have to be procured down to the lake.
This would be a prohibitive undertaking in itself, not to
mention as it would be multiplied by the countless other
branch ditch ends on a large irrigation system, in respect
of \Yhich the duty also would exist if it existed here. There
is no showing in the record of any feasible way to extend
the ditch below the lower user, Christenson, and there is
no reason for doing so, because it is not contemplated that
any water shall flow past that point.
A consideration of the realities of the situation, in the
light of legal principle, seems to suggest that an irrigation
company distributing water to laterals maintained and controlled by stockholders of such company, and others, under
a system of turns arranged by such stockholders, is not under the duty of assuring,at its peril, that all such laterals
and branches thereof, to, and beyond, the lowest user, shall
have means for the disposal of excess water in the event
that any user fails to take his turn or water beyond the
control of the company otherwise gets into, or flows
through, the laterals and their branches.
Section 100-1-8, RSU, 1943, provides, among other
things that the owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other
water course shall maintain the same in repair so as to
prevent waste of water or damage to the property of others.
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This section does not establish any absolute liability,
but plaintiff must allege and prove negligence or want of
ordinary care on defendant's part in the construction, operation or maintenance of defendant's ditch. Mackay v.
Breeze, 72 U. 305, 269 Pac. 1026. We shall have more to
say about negligence under point III herein. For the present, we wish to emphasize that there is no proof whatsoever
in the record that the appellant owned the Southeast Ditch
proper at the time of the injury, much less the remote
branches and branch ends such as the one which ended at
the Christenson property, the lowest property watered from
this branch.
It must be common knowledge that laterals, sublaterals and branches thereof through which farmers located
thereon obtain their water ordinarily are not owned as
such by the canal companies which turn the water therein
at the request of stockholders. If there were any interference with any such branches or sub-ditches, the individual users would be the ones with a standing in court.
It seems impossible to envisage a canal company owning
all the ditches and sub-ditches through which water originally supplied by it ultimately might pass. But it seemn unnecessary to further urge this matter of judicial notice.
The burden was upon the plaintiff and he failed to show
any ownership by the Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation
Company of the branch lateral involved.
Aside from the question of ownership, does the evidence give rise to a duty to design or construct, because of
any assumption of management and control by appellant,
as in the case of Chipman vs. American Fork City, 46 U.
134, 148 P. 1103; s. c. 54 U. 93, 179 Pac 742?. The record
is singularly free from dispute on this point. The South-
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east Ditch and other laterals handle not only the water
furnished by appellant, but Provo Reservoir Company and
Tanner water as well (125-128). The canal company has
nothing to do \vith the administration of laterals or in designating officers (333-334) . There is no Southeast Ditch
Company, except as that refers to a group of farmers using \Vater from that ditch. The ditch across Christenson's
land is his O\Vll ditch (124). The canal company has no
control over the gate used by farmers on the ditch to turn
back \Vater which they do not desire to use during their
turns (368). The canal company has nothing to do with
the appointment of a secretary on the respective ditches
(110). The canal company has never assumed anything
to do \vith the distribution of water of the respective ditches
(110, 128; 362, 353). The ditch has been in substantially
the same position for about forty years (124).
Rights through ditches are ordinarily acquired by
grant, lice~se, prescription or by eminent domain. 2 Kinney on Irr. and Water, p. 1456, par. 830. Even principal
laterals and branches are not necessarily controlled by the
same ownership. The sale of a ditch will not necessarily
include a lateral. 2 Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights,
2d Ed. p. 1785, par. 1003.
The practicalities of the situation indicate that the appellant was under no duty as to construction and design of
the branches of the Southeast Ditch, and particularly Christenson's ditch.
The failure of proof as to ownership so indicates.
The affirmative evidence as to control so indicates.
The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff. It failed
to assume such burden with respect to any duty of construction or design. As a matter of fact, such duty was not
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pleaded, and no express finding was made of it or of the
facts upon which it might, be predicated. Yet, in the absence of such a duty assumed by the trial court, the effect
of the decision is to make the canal company a virtual insuror that water originating in its canal will never cause
anyone else damage, no matter in whose ditch it is found,
or into whose control it has passed.
II.

A CONTINUING DUTY OF MANAGEMENT AND CONTRJC)L DID NOT REST UPON APPELLANT WITH
RESPECT TO WATER FROM ITS CANAL AFTER
IT HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED INTO THE SOUTHEAST DITCH AT THE REQUEST OF STOCKHOLDERS ON THAT DITCH.
Assignments of error numbered 3, 9, 10, and 11, particularly, are covered by this heading, although all other
assignments going to the general question of negligence
are indirectly involved.
In finding N!o. 4 the trial court found that the "Southeast Ditch Company" is an association of stockholders for
the convenience of said company (JR 54). Without expressly so holding, the inference is that the corporation had
the duty of doing all that the users on the ditch did for
themselves (Assignment No. 3). Finding No. 7 indicates
that the appellant had the duty of notifying the users on
the ditch when the water would be turned down to them,
and had the duty to provide for the care of excess and unused water (Assignments 9, 10 and 11).
The latter finding ignored the undisputed evidence
that the water was turned into the Southeast Ditch at the
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beginning of the irrigation season at the request of stockholders therein, and \Vas divided by them into turns, and
that every period of every day was assigned among themselves, and that there was no period when someone was not
assigned the use of the \Vater (369). There is no proof
that any user failed to take his turn. Aside from this point,
which will be later considered, and speaking here strictly
of duty, how can it be reasonably argued that the canal
company must police not only 70 users assigned water
around the clock on the Southeast Ditch, but similarly numerous users on the other laterals diverting from the company, to see to it, under penalty of being liable itself, that
each user takes the \Vater for the full extent of his turn,
and that no waste, flood, return, or unused water gets back
into the ditch? To assume the responsibility on each lateral and branch, and with respect to each user (and there
is the end of a ditch of one sort or another on the land of
every user) would be to place a burden upon the canal
company which would be impractical and intolerable. It
would penalize the average stockholder as well as the company, and encourage suits against the company on all manner of speculative and fanciful claims, despite the most burdensome expenditures for policing work.
We submit that on the basis of the facts in the record,
for a more detailed statement of which reference is made
to the summary of facts, supra, the law does not impose
any such duty.

III.
THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF ANY DUTY OR ANY
NEGLIGENCE AS PLEADED, OR AT ALL, ON THE
PART OF PROVO BENCH CANAL AND IRRIGA-
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TION COMPANY, AND THE PLEADINGS AND
EVIDENCE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE
CONCLUSION O~F NEGLIGENCE.
Assignments numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, and
17. The assignments relate to determinations of the trial
court, including ruling on general demurrer, findings, conclusion, judgment, ruling on motion for non-suit, and ruling on motion for new trial, necessarily premised upon the
assumption that there was negligence on the part of the
Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company.
We say these rulings were necessarily premised on
such assumption, because, assuming responsibility for the
sake of argument, the carrying of water through ditches is
not a dangerous undertaking (4 Kinney on Irr. and Water
Rights, 2d Ed. p. 3079, par. 1672). The plaintiff must allege and prove negligence in order to recover (Ibid, p.
3080) . The owners of ditches and canals are not insurers
(Ibid, p. 3077). See. also Brian v. Fremont Irr. Co., 186
Pac. 2d 588, _ _Utah _ _ ; Mackay vs. Breeze, et al, 269
Pac. 1026, 72 Ut. 305, supra; Annotation "Liability for overflow or escape of water from reservoir, ditch, or artificial
pond," 169 A. L. R., 517, 523-529.
We are of the impression that the learned trial judge
considered the duty of an irrigation company so broad with
respect to water originating in its system as to make it a
virtual insurer. If this is the purport of the· decision, as it
seems to us, it is ~contrary to the great weight of authority,
including the doctrine followed by the Supreme c·ourt of
the State of Utah. If this is not the purport of the trial
court's determination, but if it is founded up assumed negligence, then we submit such ·determination cannot stand,
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because of the insufficiency of both pleadings and proof
with respect thereto.
Paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint charges that
the irrigation water of the Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company . . . . was negligently, wilfully and
tmlawfully permitted, allowed and caused to flow from said
ditch . . . . (JR 29). Up to and including paragraph
5, this is the only charge of any negligence, and there is
nothing appearing to the effect that the negligence charged
\Vas attributable to, or committed by, appellant, or anyone
else specifically. The water was ''negligently permitted,''
etc., but by whom the complaint does not indicate. The
same paragraph alleges damages of $2500.00, but does not
enlighten us as to who caused them or \Vhat negligence of
what particular person or persons was responsible (JR 29).
Paragraph 6 charges certain individual defendants, not
including appellant, with negligent failure to care for their
water during their assigned turns, thus admitting that the
water was the individuals' during the period in question.
No mention of appellant is made therein, nor any connection with the appellant herein asserted (JR 30).
Paragraph 7 charges that appellant failed and neglected to notify the individual stockholders of the time said
water would be put in said ditch, and neglected to provide
for excess water, knowing that it was not cared for and was
a potential danger, and after it had been notified of the
failure of stockholders to take care of the water. This paragraph assumes that notification of possible or anticipated
damage gives rise to liability, which we think does not necessarily follow. There must first appear a duty, and then
a breach. The plaintiff in paragraph 6 of its Amended
Complaint has already alleged that the individual defen-
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dants were, during the times material, authorized, entitled
to and required to use the water in said ditch, and that they
negligently and wilfully failed and refused to use said water (JR 29) . If there were a wilful failure on their part, as
alleged, and if they had been authorized and were required
to take said water, then the conclusion that appellant failed
to notify them of the time the ·water would be put in the
ditch would seem nullified. If all water were assigned, and
the stockholders were required to use it, it would not seem
to be "excess water."
The final paragraph in the Amended Complaint is that
by reason of the negligence of the defendants as above set
forth plaintiff was damaged (JR 30) . The difficulty here
is that there is no negligence above set forth attributable
to appellant.
The findings are a little broader than the complaint,
but not much better. As a consequence, it would seem that
the general demurrer should have been sustained. At the
present time, the judgment, unsupported by sufficient
pleadings, and based on inadequate findings, should be set
aside.
Assuming, however, that there are sufficient allegations and findings of negligence on the part of appellant,
we submit that there· is no proof to support such pleadings
or to sustain such findings.
The charge that appellant failed to notify its stockholders when water would be put in the Southeast Ditch
must fail, in view of the undisputed evidence heretofore
pointed out that the water ·was put in the ditch at the beginning of the irrigating season, and its use was rotated
among the stockholders on such ditch pursuant to their
own arrangements. There was no question of putting the

.
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\Vater in. or withholding the water from, the ditch, or notice thereof, involved.
To the charge that appellant failed to provide for the
care of excess and unused water, a complete answer is that
there ,,·as no excess \Vater, because turns were assigned
around the clock by the stockholders themselves. As a
matter of fact, there \Vas no proof that there was any unused \Vater. There is no proof that any stockholder failed
to use the \Vater throughout his assigned turn. But were
there unused \Vater. it 'vould be impossible for any company to assume responsibility for the use of all water by
every stockholder on a ditch serving seventy individuals,
in connection 'vith a number of similar ditches. The practicalities of the situation, as \Veil as the law, we believe, negatives such duty.
Yet, were .this burden the irrigation company's, it is
further established without dispute that there had been
provided by the stockholders themselves a system whereby
~Y unused water could be turned out of the Southeast
Ditch by notification to one Olsen at the head, should any
stockholder not desire his turn. There was also the north
branch of the ditch available for the diversion of any water
not desired by any stockholder, because from this branch
there could be no possibility of entry into the West Union
Canal.
The evidence is insufficient to show that any particular quantity of water was in the Southeast Ditch at any
time during the night in question. In fact, no attempt was
made by the plaintiff to fix the quantity entering the road,
although the burden was upon it. The fact that water was
in the ditch, assuming it were not rain water, no more
shovvs that a person on the ditch, whether a Tanner, Provo
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Reservoir or Provo Bench stockholder, failed to take his
turn, than that he took his turn and the water later flooded
into the ditch lower down.
When the question of negligence is considered, it is
interesting to contrast the known acts and failures of the
plaintiff and its officers and stockholders with those of the
appellant.
The night before the flume went out an officer of plaintiff company saw water running down the road near the
Davis Corner toward the West Union Canal. He-took no
action or made no report to other officers of the company
(190-191). The night before the break the water master
of plaintiff company observed some debris on the screen
near the intake of the pipe, but did not clean it off (243).
During the night the \Vater in lateral two was reported to
have been turned back into the main canal, and the water
master had such inadequate control or information concerning his own system as to be unable to state one way or
another (259, 261). A drain from the State road, unconnected with the Southeast Ditch, was carrying a substantial flow of flood water into the canal, and was, and is, so
arranged as to do this over a period of time, but no action
was taken by West Union officials. The flume was constructed on loose sand without engineering advice, and no
special precautions were taken during the heavy rai~ on the
night in question. Before any water entered from the road
at the Davis Corner, the West Union Canal was flowing
approximately 50 second feet, and the capacity of the pipe
line at the Skinner Hollow was not to exceed 35 second feet,
making a washout inevitable (287-296, 77).
On the other hand, in view of the rain the morning of
May 27th, the officers of the appellant had gone to the
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mouth of Provo Canyon and reduced the flow in their canal to about a third ( 359-360; 382-383) . They had theretofore notified users on the individual ditches that the care
of the water \vas their responsibility, and that steps should
be taken to avoid any possible damage (Pl. Ex. H.). In
short, the evidence fails to show anything that the officers
of appellant did or omitted \Vhich indicated failure to act
reasonably.
If there were any actionable negligence alleged against
appellant, there was total failure of proof of such negligence, and there was a failure to show that any claimed
act or omission on the part of appellant caused the damage
to plaintiff, which brings us to our final proposition.
IV.

IF NEGLIGENCE WERE ASSUMED FOR THE SAKE
OF ARGUMENT, THERE IS NO c·oMPETENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THIS CAUSED OR
CONTRIBqrED TO THE DAMAGES CLAIMED
AND AWARDED; SUCH CLAIMED DAMAGES
ANID THE CASUAL CONNECTION ARE -PURELY
SPECULATIVE AND CONJECTURAL, AND THE
EVIDENCE AFFIRllVIATIVELY SHOWS THAT THE
ACTS OF THE PLAINTIFF ITSELF WERE THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE AT THE
SKINNER HOLLOW.
Assignments numbered 2, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17
are covered hereunder.
We have already sketched above some of the factors
indicating acts or omissions of the plaintiff itself which
caused or contributed to its own damage. Aside from the
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question of contributory negligence, however, the fact remains that appellant or any person or persons connected
with it did not cause, and could not have caused, the damage at Skinner Hollow.
Before any water entered the West Union Canal in
the vicinity of Davis Corner, the canal was already running
full at that point, in a volume of approximately 50 second
feet. The capacity of the pipe line below was 35 second
feet (72, 77-78). A washout was inevitable, as it is undisputed that there was no safety spillway for any excess
flow . After water entered at the Davis Corner from the
road, the capacity of the canal was reduced by gravel (78),
and hence had the pipe not already washed out, the danger thereof would have been reduced. Thus the evidence
negatives any casual connection between any claimed failures of appellant and the washout at Skinner's Hollow.
The evidence of Mr. Davis was positive, certain and uncon.tradicted. There is no evidence in the record, except his,
as to whether or not the canal was running full during the
night.
The record shows that the West Union Canal has broken its banks at other times when it was raining (170).
The flume was built on very loose and unstable sand. It
was a common occurrence to find trash on the screen (249).
The water master did not know what the West Union was
flowing at any particular time, except for the River Commissioner's records, and his last measurement was the morning before the break (253-255). The loose sand and gravel under the concrete works at Skinner Hollow washes
fast when the rain gets in (265). There was no evidence
of washing in the vicinity of the screen (268). There have
been frequent occasions when water from higher ground
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runs into West Union Canal and washes over the banks,
this often occurring \Vhen others above are irrigating (268).
Consider these, and the other facts outlined in the
Statement of Facts, supra, in the light of these circumstances: The time of the washout at Skinner's Hollow within
a t\velve-hour period was not fixed. The time any person
on the Southeast Ditch failed to use his water, or the fact
that anyone failed to use his water, was not fixed. The
amount of water flowing in the West Union Canal at the
time of the break, except for the testimony of Davis that it
\vas running full during that night, was not fixed. The
amount of \Vater entering the West Union Canl at the Davis Corner \Vas not fixed. The amount of water entering
at the new State Road \vas not fixed, except that it was sufficient to make a bigger wash than at the Davis Corner.
How the break at Skinner's Hollow was caused was not determined, except that it could either have been from an excess flo\v in the canal or from debris flowing over or
through the screen and blocking the intake pipe. Where
the debris came from on the screen was not fixed, except to
suggest it might have come from the Davis Corner or
countless other places along the canal where livestock were
fed, or from the drain on the new State Road, or other places. It is pure speculation and conjecture to say that any
stick or piece of straw or willow or other debris arriving
at the Skinner's Hollow originated at the Davis Road; on
the other hand, because of the excessive flow in the canal
before any \Vater entered at the Davis Corner, it seems
certain that the flume had gone out theretofore.
There is some evidence that at sometime during the
night after 2 o'clock, and after the canal had run full for
several hours, some water in an uncertain amount entered
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the West Union Canal from the road at the Davis Corner.
It is also apparent that sometime during that night the
flume at Skinner's Hollow washed out. There was no relationship established between these two events.
The facts in evidence do not make a case, unless the
appellant is not only an insurer against damage from water
originating in its canal, but also against any and all damage to the West Union Canal, whether shown to have any
direct or remote connection with it or not.
The damages awarded are founded upon pure speculation-worse than that-upon an affirmative showing that
appellant had no connection with the washout at Skinner's
Hollow, which occurred from an excess flow in the West
Union Canal traceable in no respect to appellant. It is purely speculation without proof to suppose that the appellant
was responsible for any water entering the West Union
Canal, and we submit that there is no justification on the
basis of even speculation to-suppose that such water or anything carried with it washed out the flume at Skinner's Hollow.
CONCLUSION
By reason of a combination of circumstances that is
unlikely ever to arise again-an inadequate flume since replaced, heavy rain, a canal running beyond the capacity of
an intake pipe installed on loose sand, water from uncertain sources, in uncertain amounts, entering the canal at
various points during the night, and the various other peculiar facts shown by the record-the West Union Canal
Co. suffered damages to a somewhat speculative amount,
but now has a better and more efficient structure. It may
be natural for it to seek to recover its alleged loss from
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others. That attempt, and the amount awarded, are relatively unimportant.
However, the West Union Canal Company, as well as
the Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company, and the
scores of similar enterprises throughout the State, and
their stockholders, will be irreparably prejudiced if unsound
doctrine as to the duty of canal companies is accepted; if
an unjustified and impractical burden is placed upon them
in the nature of policing and regulating matters not within
their customary responsibility; if claims against them as
virtual insurers are fostered; and if ordinary care is interpreted as actionable negligence because canal companies
defendant are involved; the public as a whole will suffer if
proximate cause by precedent is made supportable by conjecture and speculation.
In view of the significance of these phases, and because:
No duty either in respect to construction or management on which liability can be founded was established as
to appellant,
No actionable negligence was proved,
No proximate relationship between the claimed negligence and the damages awarded was shown,
The judgment should be reversed and plaintiff's action
dismissed, with costs to appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON,
Attorneys for Appellants
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